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Human behavior can be paradoxical, in that actions can be initiated that are seemingly
incongruent with an individual’s explicit desires. This is most commonly observed in drug
addiction, where maladaptive behavior (i.e., drug seeking) appears to be compulsive, con-
tinuing at great personal cost. Approach biases toward addictive substances have been
correlated with actual drug-use in a number of studies, suggesting that this measure can,
in some cases, index everydaymaladaptive tendencies.At present it is unclearwhether this
bias to drug cues is a Pavlovian conditioned approach response, a habitual response, the
result of a Pavlovian-instrumental transfer process, or a goal-directed action in the sense
that expectancy of the rewarding effects of drugs controls approach. We consider this
question by combining the theoretical framework of associative learning with the available
evidence from approach bias research. Although research investigating the relative contri-
butions of these mechanisms to the approach bias is to date relatively limited, we review
existing studies and also outline avenues for future research.
Keywords: approach, dual-process theory, addiction, associative learning, motivation, goal-directed action, habit,
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer
INTRODUCTION
To what extent is human behavior under voluntary control? Drug
addiction is an extreme example, where drug seeking continues
despite negative social or interpersonal consequences. Although
many drug users are fully aware of the negative consequences and
seek treatment in order to abstain from drug use, risk of relapse
remains high. This highlights the paradoxical, destructive charac-
teristic of addiction: that drug-seeking behavior persists despite
explicit motivations to the contrary. Understanding the cognitive
and motivational mechanisms that maintain such behaviors may
allow us to better understand action control in general.
The approach bias is a behavioral inclination to approach
rather than avoid certain stimuli. Experimental research into the
approach bias has provided evidence for correlations with actual
drug use and it is theorized that an approach bias may contribute
to problematic drug-related behavior (Stacy and Wiers, 2010). An
important question that remains to be addressed, however, is what
the approach bias represents and how it relates to other features
of drug use such as craving. Specifically, it is not clear whether
the approach bias has the characteristics of being a goal-directed
behavior, controlled by the expectancy of a rewarding outcome.
Alternatively, it may better fit the profile of a Pavlovian condi-
tioned response, or of a persistent, habitual response to drug cues,
or it may be driven by Pavlovian-instrumental interactions.
In the present paper, we provide a comprehensive overview of
these possible mechanisms that may facilitate the approach bias
toward addictive substances. To this end, we relate the approach
bias to theories of addiction as well as theoretical concepts of
associative learning theory (based on fundamental animal as well
as human behavioral research). Furthermore, we critically review
the experimental measurement of approach bias and the evidence
that it can underlie maladaptive behaviors. The existing literature
does not allow firm conclusions to be drawn about the relative
contributions of different mechanisms, although we hope that
this manuscript will inspire empirical investigations of this issue.
To further stimulate such investigations, we will outline several
possible avenues for future research at the end of this article.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Addiction has been described as a progressive neurological disor-
der of learning and memory whereby everyday associative learning
processes become pathological (Hyman, 2005; Koob and Volkow,
2010). Teenagers experimenting with alcohol, for example, may
discover that it makes them feel sociable and lively. The initial
learning of associations between rewarding outcomes and the con-
texts or behaviors that lead to them, allows for the emergence
of goal-directed behavior (e.g., approaching the bar at a party
in order to feel sociable). For many teenagers, this goal-directed
behavior can over time become habitual, such that simply being in
a party context is the impetus to move toward the bar, regard-
less of any consideration of possible (pleasant) outcomes. For
some individuals it may ultimately also persist when this behav-
ior has undesirable consequences. Those individuals that continue
to consume alcohol despite pervasive negative consequences and
sometimes even explicit intentions to abstain may be regarded as
compulsive drug-users (Koob and Volkow, 2010).
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A number of learning and reward processes underlie this behav-
ioral transition from voluntary drug use to clinically recognized
drug dependency whereby the consumption is maintained at
increasingly high cost. Associative learning theories, arising from
the systematic study of animal behavior and neurobiology, offer a
coherent framework for defining and dissociating these processes
(see Balleine et al., 2008; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2009). Initial
empirical investigations in humans support the case for apply-
ing the associative framework to human behavior (review: de Wit
and Dickinson, 2009). The psychological constructs arising from
associative learning theory are also paralleled in some neurocom-
putational models of decision-making, and we refer the interested
reader to recent publications on this topic for an in-depth dis-
cussion (Daw et al., 2005; Dayan et al., 2006; Balleine et al.,
2008). We shall discuss approach behavior within the associative
learning context, because this context provides the most useful
concepts to understand and investigate approach and avoidance
behavior. At the same time, however, we emphasize that a purely
non-propositional, associative framework can be argued to be
insufficient as an exhaustive account of human decision-making
(see for example Mitchell et al., 2009, but see also associated
commentaries).
PAVLOVIAN OR CLASSICAL CONDITIONING
Associations between environmental cues (e.g., beer at a party)
and motivationally relevant events (e.g., feeling lively and socia-
ble) are acquired over time and may play an important role in
guiding everyday decision-making. The conditions under which
such associations emerge have been studied by means of Pavlov-
ian (or classical) conditioning methods that establish a predictive
relationship between these (Pavlov, 1927). Conditioned stimuli
(CS) are cues that were once irrelevant (e.g., a food bowl) and that
through repetitive pairing with a motivationally relevant stimulus
(e.g., food) come to elicit conditioned responses. These condi-
tioned responses can be consummatory in nature (e.g., salivation)
or preparatory (approach toward the food bowl; Konorski, 1967).
Furthermore, it has been shown in humans that Pavlovian condi-
tioning can lead to acquired likes and dislikes of previously neutral
objects and places (evaluative conditioning; Hermans et al., 2002;
Hofmann et al., 2010). These processes may play an important role
in drug-seeking behavior as contexts that were previously paired
with the rewarding experience of drug taking become preferred
and will elicit conditioned approach responses that may support
drug seeking.
PAVLOVIAN VERSUS INSTRUMENTAL LEARNING
While conditioned approach may well contribute to the approach
bias, there may also be an instrumental component. Whereas
Pavlovian behavior results from the contingencies between stimuli
and motivationally relevant events, instrumental behavior arises
from the contingency between a response and a motivationally
relevant outcome (Skinner, 1938). If the outcome is rewarding,
the instrumental agent will acquire the responses that lead to this
outcome.
Embedded within any instrumental contingency is also a
Pavlovian relationship between the context and the outcome.
For example, where a light stimulus (S) may signal that a lever
press response (R) will produce a food pellet outcome (O) there
is an inherent, parallel S–O relationship between the light and
the rewarding food pellet being conditioned. Often a conditioned
Pavlovian response will facilitate instrumental behavior (e.g., sali-
vation or approach to the food bowl will facilitate eating behavior).
There are occasions, however, when contradicting instrumental
and Pavlovian responses (whether preparatory or consummatory)
can cause conflict (Sheffield, 1965; Hershberger, 1986). Hersh-
berger (1986), for example, created a “looking glass world” in
which a food bowl receded with twice the speed at which hun-
gry chicks ran toward it, and drew near at twice the speed at which
the chicks ran away from it. To gain access to the food the chicks
had to learn to overcome the Pavlovian bias to approach the food
bowl, which acted as a CS for the food it contained. Most chicks
continued to run toward the bowl, however, and thereby lost the
available food. The approach bias of these chicks was clearly con-
trolled predominantly by Pavlovian conditioning, as sensitivity to
the R–O contingency should have allowed them to learn to make
the opposite response of running away from the food bowl. On the
other hand, it is well-known that animals, as well as humans, are
capable of instrumental behavior. In a later section we will review
the evidence for an instrumental component of the approach bias
in humans as measured in the laboratory.
FROM GOAL-DIRECTED ACTIONS TO HABITUAL RESPONSES
Instrumental conditioning could contribute to the approach bias
by giving rise to either goal-directed approach or to habitual
approach that is triggered directly by environmental stimuli. Goal-
directed actions are performed in order to achieve desirable out-
comes (e.g., approaching the bar at a party to feel more lively and
sociable) and are thus flexibly modulated by the incentive value of
the outcome (Adams and Dickinson, 1981). Over time, however,
these appetitive outcomes gradually reinforce S–R associations,
that give rise to habitual responding that is directly evoked by the
context. In this scenario, the party context triggers approach, rather
than consideration of the drinking outcome. Overtraining of an
instrumental action is one way to bring about habitual respond-
ing (Adams, 1982; Dickinson, 1985; Tricomi et al., 2009). In the
early stages of drug use, drug-seeking behavior appears to meet
the criteria for goal-direction action. Habitual drug seeking trig-
gered by certain cues and contexts may, however, help to maintain
drug-seeking behavior, even when the drug is no longer desired.
In animal studies, the degree to which behavior is goal-directed
or habitual is formally assessed by means of the outcome devalua-
tion procedure. In this procedure instrumental training is followed
by devaluation of the instrumental outcome (e.g., through satia-
tion on a particular food reward). Subsequently, an extinction
test is conducted to assess instrumental responding for the deval-
ued outcome. If behavior is predominantly under goal-directed
control, responding for the devalued outcome should be immedi-
ately reduced. In contrast to goal-directed behavior, S–R habits are
not sensitive to devaluation of outcomes and such behavior will
persist.
PAVLOVIAN-TO-INSTRUMENTAL TRANSFER
A popular beer brand logo can prompt thoughts of beer drink-
ing, which may increase the probability that an individual will
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head to the nearest bar and realize that outcome. This anticipatory
effect is formally described as Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer
(PIT). In lab demonstrations of this phenomenon, a common
outcome (such as a food reward) functions as both a Pavlov-
ian reward and also an instrumental reward, in separate training
phases. This training allows for the separate development of both
Pavlovian S–O expectancies and instrumental O–R associations.
The interaction effect is then assessed by presenting the Pavlov-
ian cue whilst the subject is given the opportunity to perform
the instrumental response for that outcome. Many studies have
shown that although the Pavlovian cue was never directly paired
with a response, the expectancy elicited by the cue increases the
likelihood of instrumental responding for that specific reward
(outcome-specific PIT) or in some cases boosts responding gen-
erally (general PIT; Estes, 1948; Rescorla and Solomon, 1967;
Corbit and Balleine, 2005). PIT effects are now well documented
in humans (Hogarth et al., 2007; Bray et al., 2008; Talmi et al.,
2008; Hogarth and Chase, 2011; Huys et al., 2011; Nadler et al.,
2011; Hogarth, 2012) and both forms of transfer (specific and
general) could play a role in instrumental approach behavior.
For example, the sight of a beer brand logo may remind one of
beer drinking which may activate approach behavior that is previ-
ously been instrumental in obtaining beer, via S–O–R associations.
General PIT, on the other hand, can only further strengthen a pre-
existing bias. For example, if there is already an approach bias
toward alcohol, then any reward-associated cue (such as a ciga-
rette logo for smokers) may further increase that bias by boosting
the dominant approach response. Intriguingly, in animals, PIT
effects have been shown to be insensitive to outcome devalua-
tion (Rescorla, 1994; Holland, 2004) suggesting that these could
play an important role in addiction relapse. Two recent studies in
smokers provided evidence that Pavlovian cues predicting smok-
ing outcomes increase the likelihood of responding for cigarettes
and that furthermore, this can occur regardless of the current
incentive value of the smoking outcome (Hogarth and Chase,
2011; Hogarth, 2012). In these studies, Pavlovian cues increased
responding for cigarettes even after participants had read health
warnings about cigarettes (Hogarth and Chase, 2011) or been
treated with nicotine replacement therapy (Hogarth, 2012) and,
crucially, had decreased responding in the absence of the cues. It
seems paradoxical that this behavior, controlled by the anticipa-
tion of the outcome it produces, is not modulated by the current
incentive value of that outcome, but this effect has been con-
vincingly demonstrated in animals and humans (Rescorla, 1994;
Holland, 2004; Hogarth and Chase, 2011; Hogarth, 2012; but
see Allman et al., 2010). It appears, therefore, that in outcome-
specific Pavlovian-instrumental interactions, the representation
of the outcome contains sensory, but not motivationally relevant
information (see Delamater and Oakeshott, 2007). The result is
that the perceptual characteristics of the outcome prompt the
associated response, regardless of the current incentive value of
that outcome. Future research should elucidate the exact mech-
anism that mediates outcome-specific PIT, but on the basis of
these outcome-reevaluation studies, we will make a distinction in
the remainder of this manuscript between goal-directed action
and outcome-specific PIT, with the latter also being mediated by
anticipation of the outcome but occurring independently of the
incentive goal status of the outcome.
THEORIES OF ADDICTION
The motivation driving destructive drug-seeking behavior is a
key component of all major theories of addiction and most
provide some explanation for why environmental cues can trig-
ger relapse, even after long periods of sobriety. Some theories
make clear predictions about the mechanisms that could facili-
tate an approach bias toward drug cues and whether such a bias
is goal-directed, stimulus-bound habits, or due to PIT anticipa-
tory processes. Relevant to the discussion at hand are incentive
sensitization, theories based on the role of expectancy, various
dual-process models (including habit theories of addiction), and
negative reinforcement models.
INCENTIVE SENSITIZATION
The incentive sensitization model proposes that repeated drug
use causes neuroadaptations in mesolimbic dopaminergic systems
controlling the incentive values assigned to drug stimuli (Robin-
son and Berridge, 1993; Berridge, 2007). Over time a pathological
incentive value becomes attributed to drug cues and contexts
prompting compulsive drug-taking. This incentive sensitization
increases even whilst levels of subjective pleasure decrease over the
course of addiction (defined as increased “wanting” even in the
absence of “liking” a drug). Thus whilst drugs can become disliked
and an individual may have explicit motivations to avoid them,
cues remain extremely salient and continue to elicit craving and
motivate approach behavior (Robinson and Berridge, 1993, 2000,
2001).
EXPECTANCY THEORIES
Some models propose that expectancies of drug outcomes
play a crucial role in motivating drug-seeking behavior. Gold-
man and colleagues argue that drug use is a goal-directed
choice, based on the expectation of the hedonic effect of the
drug outcome (Goldman et al., 1987; Goldman, 2002). Fol-
lowing a meta-analysis of conditioning studies using tobacco
rewards, Hogarth and Duka (2006) found evidence for the
role of expectancies in drug-seeking behaviors. Recently, how-
ever, this view was extended, given demonstrations that cue-
elicited anticipation of a cigarette reward prompted respond-
ing for that reward, even when incentive value was low.
The authors suggested therefore that parallel goal-directed
expectancies and PIT anticipatory processes jointly deter-
mine action control (Hogarth and Chase, 2011; Hogarth,
2012).
DUAL-PROCESS MODELS
There are various dual-process models of addiction. Similarly to
Tiffany’s habit theory of addiction (Tiffany, 1990; Tiffany and
Conklin, 2000), associative theories make a distinction between
goal-directed and stimulus-bound behaviors (Everitt et al., 2001;
Everitt and Robbins, 2005; de Wit and Dickinson, 2009; Hogarth
and Chase, 2011; Hogarth, 2012). Another group of dual-process
models describe an automatic, appetitive system opposed by an
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executive control system (Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Wiers et al.,
2007; Hofmann et al., 2008, 2009; Stacy and Wiers, 2010). These
will be discussed in turn.
Habitual versus goal-directed control in dual-process models
Tiffany’s habit theory of addiction (Tiffany, 1990; Tiffany and
Conklin, 2000) proposes that over time, drug-taking “rituals”
become automatic behavioral schema, prompted by the environ-
ment. Whilst there are many unique features within Tiffany’s
model, this transition from goal-directed to habitual behavior
is also captured by associative dual-process models of addiction
(Everitt et al., 2001; Everitt and Robbins, 2005). According to this
view, the reinforcing effects of drugs lead to strong S–R associ-
ations between contextual stimuli and drug-seeking behaviors.
Over time, approach behavior toward drugs becomes a habit-
ual response, triggered by environmental cues. This behavioral
transition appears to be paralleled by impaired functioning of
cortico-striatal networks supporting goal-directed behavior (Por-
rino et al., 2004; Everitt and Robbins, 2005). In a slightly different
vein, Hogarth and Chase (2011) argue that goal-directed and
PIT anticipatory processes operate in an additive manner, jointly
determining behavior.
Implicit versus explicit control in dual-process models
Another set of dual-process models are centered upon the notion
that appetitive behavior can be automatically triggered by a variety
of cues and that this behavior needs to be regulated by executive
control processes, maintaining goal focus, and motivation to resist
use and abuse of drugs (Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Wiers et al.,
2007; Hofmann et al., 2008, 2009; Stacy and Wiers, 2010). Indi-
vidual differences in impulsivity and cognitive control modulate
the effectiveness of this regulation (Dawe et al., 2004; Hofmann
et al., 2009; Peeters et al., 2012). The impulsive and executive
dual processes can be mapped fairly well onto the stimulus-bound
and goal-directed distinction of associative models, although it
should be noted that the reflective control system is often argued
to be propositional in nature, not associative (Strack and Deutsch,
2004).
Negative reinforcement theories
Alleviation of a negative affective state – either withdrawal symp-
toms or more generally, depression or stress – is a commonly
cited cause of relapse (Carey and Correia, 1997; Shiffman and
Waters, 2004; Kuntsche et al., 2005). Negative reinforcement the-
ories highlight the role of internal cues (negative affective states)
in prompting drug use (Koob and Le Moal, 1997; Baker et al.,
2004; Eissenberg, 2004; Ahmed and Koob, 2005). Koob and col-
leagues propose that addiction is the result of dysfunction in not
only the reward system but also the anti-reward system, driving
aversive states (Ahmed and Koob, 2005; Koob and Le Moal, 2005).
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to provide a detailed
overview of negative reinforcement theories, but for the purposes
of the current discussion we would like to note that similar moti-
vational mechanisms may underlie drug-seeking based on the
rewarding properties of drugs versus avoidance of aversive states
(Baker et al., 2004; Eissenberg, 2004). Avoidance behavior in the
context of drug use could be either a goal-directed strategy based
on expectancies of the alleviating outcome, or a stimulus-response
habit reinforced by alleviation of negative states, or the result of
Pavlovian-instrumental interactions.
INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
Assessing the characteristics of the motivational mechanisms
underlying addictive approach behavior, should provide evi-
dence in favor of different models of addiction. These mod-
els overlap with respect to several common predictions. They
all provide an explanation for why relapse can be triggered by
environmental cues, whether this is due to S–R associations,
incentive sensitization, or triggering of goal-directed expectan-
cies. There are nonetheless a number of subtle distinctions. Many
implicit/explicit dual-process models propose that the approach
bias represents an automatic, positive evaluation of drug cues,
which is argued to be distinct from explicit processes. Goal-
directed expectancy theories on the other hand would argue that
the bias arises due to positive expectancy of the drug outcome.
Some unique predictions derive from these models, which can be
empirically tested. For example, associative dual-process models
predict that approach behavior will eventually be resistant to out-
come devaluation as behavior transitions to habitual control. This
is in stark contrast to goal-directed expectancy theories, which
predict that decreases in outcome value will continue to reduce
responding for drug outcomes.
EMPIRICAL DATA
A longstanding idea in psychological science is that a consider-
able amount of behavior is driven by rapid, evolutionary relevant,
affective evaluations of stimuli. These affective evaluations classify
all stimuli as either “negative” or “positive,” facilitating in the lat-
ter case, approach behavior (Bindra, 1974; Dickinson and Dearing,
1979; Chen and Bargh, 1999; Fazio, 2001; Krieglmeyer et al., 2010).
Motivations and affective attitudes are commonly assessed via
questionnaires. Unfortunately, however, conclusions from such
explicit measures can be difficult as participants may lack insight
into the driving forces behind their actions and choices. In
the case of addiction, invalid self-reports may result from self-
presentational strategies or self-deception in an attempt to main-
tain a positive self-image. Moreover, introspection has been argued
to not be a reliable and objective method of assessing motivational
states (Berridge et al., 2009; Schooler and Mauss, 2009; Wood and
Neal, 2009; Neal et al., 2012). As behavior becomes more habitual
over time, there may not be a corresponding shift in subjective
awareness of this fact. In the case of drug relapse, post hoc eval-
uation of one’s behavior may lead an individual to conclude that
their behavior was motivated by a craving for the drug as opposed
to being prompted by the external environment.
To overcome these difficulties and problems, a number of indi-
rect, speeded reaction-time tasks have been developed to assess the
valence and strength of affective evaluative associations (and the
resulting approach behavior) without the need for explicit reflec-
tion on the part of the subject (Fazio, 2001; De Houwer, 2006; De
Houwer et al., 2009). We focus here on measures of action ten-
dencies, although it should be noted that varieties of the Implicit
Association Task have also been used to assess approach and avoid-
ance associations of a target category such as alcohol (Palfai and
Ostafin, 2003; Ostafin and Palfai, 2006).
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition October 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 440 | 4
Watson et al. Approach bias toward addictive substances
MEASUREMENTS OF APPROACH BIAS
In order to directly assess approach tendencies, a number of tasks
have been developed that measure speed of approach toward
(generally pictorial) stimuli. Approach bias is generally measured
as the difference in reaction time on trials where participants
make an approach movement (such as pulling a joystick) versus
an avoid movement (pushing a joystick) to the pictorial stimuli on
a computer screen. A number of tasks have been developed, and
whilst they all measure approach bias, they are confusingly and
interchangeably labeled as either stimulus-response compatibility
(SRC) tasks (utilizing either a manikin or a joystick), approach
avoidance tasks (AATs), or affective Simon tasks. To avoid con-
fusion, we will use the explicit paradigm labels when describing
these tasks in later sections.
THE MANIKIN TASK
The manikin task provides an indirect measure of approach and
avoidance behaviors. Approach tendencies are assessed by cal-
culating the difference in reaction times across two blocks of
experimental trials. In the first block the participant moves a com-
puterized manikin toward one category of stimuli (e.g., alcohol)
and away from other stimuli (e.g., soft drinks). In a subsequent
block this assignment reverses. Using this task, participants have
been seen to approach positive words faster than they are avoided,
with the reverse effect for negative words (De Houwer et al., 2001).
In addition, the manikin task has been used to assess approach
behaviors in studies focusing on eating disorders (Woud et al.,
2011), obesity (Havermans et al., 2011), Pavlovian conditioning
of neutral stimuli (Thewissen et al., 2007; van Gucht et al., 2008),
as well as approach tendencies toward alcohol (Field et al., 2005b,
2008; Schoenmakers et al., 2008; van Hemel-Ruiter et al., 2011;
Barkby et al., 2012), cigarettes (Mogg et al., 2003, 2005; Bradley
et al., 2004; Field et al., 2005a), and cannabis (Field et al., 2006;
Cousijn et al., 2012).
THE JOYSTICK TASK
The joystick task can be used to measure differences in reaction
times when the participant pushes a joystick away from his/her
body in response to stimuli as opposed to pulling the joystick
toward his/her body on a subsequent block. This task has been
used to study phobias and anxiety (see Roefs et al., 2011), lifestyle
and fitness goals (Fishbach and Shah, 2006), and food deprivation
manipulations (Seibt et al., 2007).
Whilst it was originally suggested that approach and avoidance
movements are represented as stored motor patterns, triggered by
automatic, affective stimuli evaluations, it has became increasingly
clear that motor actions per se do not represent either approach or
avoidance. The same motor response (such as arm flexion) may
represent approach in one situation (moving something toward
oneself) but avoidance in another situation (quickly moving hand
away from a stimulus to be avoided; Chen and Bargh,1999). Indeed
many studies have now shown that it is an individual’s interpre-
tation of the result of the behavior that is important (i.e., is the
stimulus moved closer or further away) and as such, neutral body
movements can be interpreted as approach and avoidance actions
depending on the outcome (Lavender and Hommel, 2007; Seibt
et al., 2008; van Dantzig et al., 2008; Krieglmeyer et al., 2010). The
zooming joystick task (ZJT) is thus a disambiguated version of
the joystick task, designed to avoid misinterpretation and recate-
gorization of pushing and pulling movements. The introduction
of a zooming feature ensures that participants experience the illu-
sion of stimuli moving away from them and coming toward them
when they push or pull the joystick (this is achieved by reducing
or enlarging the size of the picture). This zooming feature reduces
the possibility of participants interpreting pulling movements as
avoid rather than approach. Using the zooming version of the task
(negative) approach tendencies to spiders have been assessed in
spider phobia (Rinck and Becker, 2007).
By asking participants to respond to an irrelevant task feature
such as orientation or location of the picture on screen instead
of the content of the picture, the task may be rendered more
implicit (De Houwer, 2003). Using the ZJT with irrelevant feature
instructions, approach bias has been examined in heavy drinkers
(Wiers et al., 2009, 2010), alcoholic patients (Wiers et al., 2011),
at-risk adolescents (Peeters et al., 2012), and heavy cannabis users
(Cousijn et al., 2011).
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
Studies correlating approach bias measures to real-life behavior,
as opposed to self-report measurements, are limited in number
(due in part to the complexity of such designs). Rinck and Becker
(2007) found that an approach bias on the ZJT predicted actual
approach behaviors to live spiders, over and above that which was
predicted with spider-phobia questionnaires. More importantly
for the present discussion, approach bias on an irrelevant feature
version of the ZJT was correlated with the amount of alcohol drunk
in what was described to participants as an unrelated consumer
“taste test” following the task (Wiers et al., 2010).
The split-half reliability of the manikin and joystick tasks
is variable but generally good when using task-relevant feature
instructions (Rinck and Becker, 2007; Krieglmeyer and Deutsch,
2010; Field et al., 2011). The advantage of instructing participants
to respond on the basis of a task irrelevant feature is that it makes
the task less susceptible to explicit control on the part of the partic-
ipant, the practical drawback is that compatibility effects tend to
be smaller (Krieglmeyer and Deutsch, 2010; Field et al., 2011). This
reduced effect may be due to the fact that attention is not drawn
to the affective properties of the stimuli in the irrelevant feature
version. Several studies have, nonetheless, demonstrated robust
approach (or avoidance) biases using irrelevant feature instruc-
tions (De Houwer et al., 2001; Rinck and Becker, 2007; Seibt et al.,
2007; Wiers et al., 2009, 2010; Veenstra and de Jong, 2010; Cousijn
et al., 2011). The reliability of the irrelevant feature instruction ver-
sion was found to be poor in one study (Krieglmeyer and Deutsch,
2010) whilst another reported reasonably good reliability (Cousijn
et al., 2011).
There are, evidentially, pros and cons to the various
approach/avoidance task versions. Two studies, conducted with
both the manikin and the standard joystick tasks, unexpect-
edly failed to find evidence for a correlation between the two
approach bias scores (Krieglmeyer and Deutsch, 2010; van Hemel-
Ruiter et al., 2011). The reasons for this are not immediately
clear although there are major differences in how approach and
avoidance are conceptualized within the tasks. Both the standard
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joystick task (without the zooming feature) and the manikin task
are susceptible to recategorization – the manikin can be recate-
gorized as someone other than the self and the approach/avoid
movements in the standard joystick task are relatively ambiguous.
Future studies should carefully select the task paradigm, depend-
ing on the research question, a point that we will return to in a
later section “Outstanding Questions and Future Directions.”
APPROACH BIASES IN ADDICTION
Using these aforementioned approach/avoidance paradigms,
addiction researchers have provided substantial evidence for a
relationship between drug-approach bias and drug use. That is,
although the approach bias is measured experimentally in a lab,
with superficial key press or lever movements, the behavioral
tendency to be faster at approaching rather than avoiding drug
stimuli, does seem to confer information about drug behavior
more generally. Approach tendencies have been demonstrated in
heavy (non-clinical) users of alcohol (Schoenmakers et al., 2008;
Wiers et al., 2009, 2010), social drinkers (Field et al., 2005b), and
cigarette smokers (Field et al., 2005a; Thewissen et al., 2007). Cig-
arette smokers have been seen to show a greater approach bias
than non-smokers (Mogg et al., 2003; Bradley et al., 2004), as
do cannabis users versus non-users (Field et al., 2006; Cousijn
et al., 2011). Hazardous (non-clinical) drinkers were seen to have
a stronger approach bias compared to light drinkers (Field et al.,
2008). These results suggest a reliable relationship between drug
use and drug-approach bias, particularly when examining healthy
participants with moderate levels of dependence.
It should be noted that patterns of results can differ depend-
ing on the populations studied. Whilst lighter drinkers showed a
weaker approach bias (Field et al., 2008), this pattern was reversed
in one study investigating light versus heavy cigarette smokers
(Mogg et al., 2005). In addition, in contrast to the aforementioned
alcohol studies (with students), three studies involving patients
receiving treatment for alcoholism did not find stronger approach
tendencies for alcohol pictures compared to soft drink pictures
(Wiers et al., 2011; Barkby et al., 2012; Spruyt et al., in press). These
studies are small in number, but differing patterns of results in dif-
ferent populations at different stages of addiction can likely tell us
something about the role of explicit motivations in approach bias
measurements. We will discuss this in further detail, in the later
section “Outstanding Questions and Future Directions.”
APPROACH TENDENCIES IN ADDICTION AND THE
UNDERLYING MOTIVATIONS
The question remains as to which of the cognitive and moti-
vational mechanisms outlined earlier in the “Theoretical Back-
ground” section contribute to the approach bias as measured in
the lab. Evidence for the contribution of a Pavlovian compo-
nent to experimental measures of the approach bias comes from
studies that have shown that CS-reward learning quickly engen-
ders an approach bias toward these novel CSs. Using different
variations of AAT, approach bias has been conditioned toward
novel Pavlovian stimuli predicting cigarette outcomes (Thewis-
sen et al., 2007) and chocolate outcomes (van Gucht et al., 2008).
A direct association between these stimuli and an instrumental
approach response cannot mediate the approach bias to novel CSs,
indicating therefore that Pavlovian mechanisms do play a role in
the approach bias.
There is evidence, however, suggesting that the approach bias
cannot be completely reduced to a purely Pavlovian conditioned
response. As discussed previously, Hershberger (1986) showed
that under conditions where chicks needed to make a withdrawal
response in order to make a food bowl move toward them, they
were unable to suppress the urge to approach the food bowl. This
behavioral inflexibility provides evidence that the approach behav-
ior of the chicks was predominantly controlled by a Pavlovian
mechanism. In contrast to chicks, however, humans are perfectly
well able to adapt their approach behavior. To our knowledge,
the human equivalent of Hershberger’s experiment has not been
conducted yet, but a recent study did employ a similar design.
In a manikin task, participants were required to make an ini-
tial brief avoid movement in order to approach positive words
and an initial brief approach movement to avoid negative words.
Krieglmeyer et al. (2011) showed that even when the initial move-
ment is avoidance, participants will still react faster if the final
outcome is that the manikin approaches positive words. The
reverse was true for avoiding negative words such that even if
the initial movement was to approach a negative word, partici-
pants reacted faster if the final outcome was avoidance. This study
suggests that the approach bias is more complex than being a mere
Pavlovian approach response, as the final outcome (is the stimulus
further away or closer) and not the initial direction of movement
(toward or away from the stimuli), seems to influence reaction
times.
Retraining studies with the joystick task provide further
evidence for instrumental control over approach behavior
(Kawakami et al., 2007, 2008; Wiers et al., 2010, 2011). For exam-
ple, Wiers et al. (2010) presented the vast majority of a set of
alcohol pictures in the push rather than pull format and found that
retraining reduced the approach bias toward these pictures. The
observation that participants can modify the bias following train-
ing (avoiding appetitive pictures) suggests that the bias is more
than a conditioned response and shows a degree of flexibility that
is in line with an instrumental account of the approach bias.
The results discussed above suggest that the approach response
is not a purely Pavlovian response, although it is challenging to
disentangle the relative contributions of Pavlovian and instru-
mental mechanisms using these paradigms. The question remains,
nonetheless, as to whether the approach bias is flexibly modulated
by changes in incentive value of the outcome or whether it is merely
triggered by the drug stimuli. A number of studies have found
that approach bias measurements increase in line with self-report
craving scores, a result that is generally interpreted to suggest that
approach behavior is sensitive to the current incentive value of the
outcome (Field et al., 2005b, 2008; van Gucht et al., 2008). How-
ever, this correlative finding should be interpreted with caution as
it does not necessarily imply a causal relationship between crav-
ing and the approach bias. Furthermore, other studies failed to
find evidence for a relationship between craving and the approach
bias (Mogg et al., 2003; Thewissen et al., 2007; Wiers et al., 2010;
Cousijn et al., 2011). However, none of those studies really address
whether behavior is immediately sensitive to a change in the incen-
tive outcome value. So far, such outcome-reevaluation designs
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have yielded mixed results. Two studies, using the manikin task,
manipulated craving by giving participants a placebo drink in one
session and a dose of alcohol in another. Approach bias scores to
alcohol pictures (Schoenmakers et al., 2008) and smoking pictures
(Field et al., 2005a) were then compared between the two sessions
(alcohol or placebo). Both studies found that self-reported craving
was higher in the alcohol session but there was no difference in the
approach bias scores – a null effect that although difficult to inter-
pret, is more in line with the habitual account. These results are
in contrast to a study using the standard joystick task, that exam-
ined the effects of satiety on the approach bias (Seibt et al., 2007).
Participant’s responses to images of food were measured either
before or after lunch and satiety did appear to reduce the bias in
the non-deprived group, suggesting that approach behavior was
driven by the current desire for food. Unfortunately, however, this
study failed to include a neutral control picture condition, and we
can therefore not ascertain whether hunger increased the approach
movement toward food pictures specifically, or approach behavior
generally. Still, these results suggest that this line of research should
be extended further to critically assess motivational modulation of
approach.
As discussed previously, some dual-process theories suggest
that the approach bias results from an interaction between asso-
ciative learning processes and explicit cognitive control processes.
Barkby et al. (2012) provided correlational evidence for the impor-
tance of cognitive control, by testing patients receiving treatment
for alcohol addiction on the manikin task. Their critical find-
ing was that approach bias scores on the manikin task correlated
with individual differences in explicit approach/avoidance inten-
tions. Further evidence, that behavioral intentions can influence
approach behavior, comes from a study using a variant of the ZJT
(Sharbanee et al., in press). Rather than calculating approach bias
as a difference score between the push and pull reaction times, this
study made a distinction between “pull alcohol picture” trials and
“push alcohol picture” trials – the former trial type assumed to be
congruent with an appetitive tendency and the latter incongruent.
Only incongruent trials, therefore, should demand recruitment of
executive control processes (to overcome the appetitive tendency
and push the alcohol picture away). As expected, results showed
that working memory scores modulated reaction times in prob-
lem drinkers attempting (unsuccessfully) to control their alcohol
consumption, but this effect was only observed on incongruent
“push alcohol” trials. This suggests that the approach bias arises
due to a complex interaction between the strength of the approach
tendency and the ability to inhibit this tendency when required.
We should point out, however, that many other studies suggest
that approach tendencies are not always under intentional con-
trol. These studies report seemingly “automatic” approach biases
that are not in line with instrumental withdrawal intentions: par-
ticipants scoring higher on a restrained eating scale showed a
greater approach bias toward food cues (Veenstra and de Jong,
2010); smokers showed an approach bias toward smoking cues that
they reported as unpleasant (Bradley et al., 2008); and appetitive
Pavlovian stimuli inhibited instrumental withdrawal in situations
where the instrumental withdrawal behavior was rewarded with
money (Huys et al., 2011). It appears, therefore, that explicit inten-
tions can sometimes influence approach, but a complete account
of the approach bias will also have to encapsulate the role of
associative learning processes.
To summarize, the evidence surveyed suggests that both Pavlov-
ian and instrumental mechanisms play a role in facilitating the
approach bias, but it is not yet clear how these processes interact or
sum to produce this behavioral tendency. Furthermore it remains
to be seen whether the approach bias is flexibly modulated by out-
come value or has the characteristics of a habitual response to drug
cues. Recent research examining instrumental responding for cig-
arette outcomes has argued that goal-directed and PIT processes
operate in parallel, summing in an additive manner (Hogarth
and Chase, 2011; Hogarth, 2012). However, the role of PIT in
the approach bias remains to be empirically addressed. Further-
more, next to associative mechanisms, behavioral intentions may
also modulate the approach bias, with one study suggesting that
the approach bias measures some combination of both appetitive
and regulatory control processes (Sharbanee et al., in press).
OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Approach bias tasks offer a fast and simple manner of measur-
ing approach tendencies to drug-related stimuli and appear to
tell us something about drug use, given that a number of studies
have correlated approach bias scores with actual drug use (Field
et al., 2008; Wiers et al., 2010; Cousijn et al., 2011) and shown
group differences between heavier versus lighter/non-users (Mogg
et al., 2003; Bradley et al., 2004; Field et al., 2006; Cousijn et al.,
2011). Whilst understanding the mechanisms that underlie the
approach bias is an important theoretical question, it should be
noted that these tasks are not ideally suited to dissociating the var-
ious motivation mechanisms introduced in the earlier “Theoret-
ical Background” section. To isolate goal-directed approach from
Pavlovian approach for example, requires a task where the instru-
mental actions are bidirectional (i.e., left and right). In such a task,
the relationships between the stimulus and the outcomes are held
constant whilst the relationships between the direction of action
and the outcomes are manipulated. The relative contribution of
Pavlovian processes is equal to both actions, and hence controlled
for (Dickinson et al., 1996). In addition, it has been observed
that outcome devaluation modulates both conditioned Pavlov-
ian responses and goal-directed instrumental responses (Colwill
and Rescorla, 1988), and as such we cannot differentiate between
these two in an outcome-reevaluation study if the approach bias is
the dependent measure. Nonetheless, whether the approach bias
is flexibly modulated by outcome reevaluation or is directly trig-
gered by the drug stimuli is an outstanding question. The studies
that have employed outcome-reevaluation paradigms have yielded
mixed results (Field et al., 2005a; Seibt et al., 2007; Schoenmakers
et al., 2008) and this line of research within the context of addictive
substances, should be continued.
Specifically, outcome-reevaluation studies conducted with
individuals at different levels of dependency, could address the
question of whether the approach bias becomes more habitual over
the course of addiction. Given the observation that users receiv-
ing clinical treatment may not show a very strong approach bias
(Wiers et al., 2011; Barkby et al., 2012; Spruyt et al., in press), this
method could also be used to assess whether control over approach
behavior is regained during (successful) treatment. The work of
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Hogarth and colleagues in the field of smoking addiction suggests
that there are a number of ways to reevaluate addictive substances,
namely health warnings, temporary satiety through consumption,
and treatments aimed at alleviating withdrawal symptoms (Hog-
arth and Chase, 2011; Hogarth, 2012). Another way may be to
pair the consumption of an appetitive substance with an aver-
sive flavor (Howard, 2001; van Gucht et al., 2010). In order to
conduct an outcome-reevaluation test, an approach bias measure-
ment would first be taken with neutral and category of interest
(e.g., smoking) pictures. Then the smoking outcome would be
devalued (e.g., through satiety) and the approach bias measure-
ment would be repeated. If the approach bias measurement is not
reduced following outcome devaluation, this would suggest that
the approach bias is a stimulus-bound response to drug stimuli.
Different versions of the approach bias tasks, as reviewed earlier,
may be better suited to reevaluation studies given that ideally a
repeated measures design is employed and that the second mea-
surement, following outcome devaluation, should be conducted in
extinction (without presentation of the outcome). The standard
joystick or manikin tasks therefore, with irrelevant feature version,
would be preferable in such a paradigm – as participant awareness
of the study aims should be reduced as much as possible.
Pavlovian-instrumental interactions are thought to play an
important role in addictive behavior (Hogarth and Chase, 2011;
Hogarth, 2012). However, whether PIT processes can confer a
specific or general motivating effect on approach/avoidance move-
ments on these tasks has not been assessed. This could be investi-
gated using, for instance, the manikin task. In an initial instrumen-
tal (O–R) learning phase, participants would make an approach
movement to earn one specific outcome and avoidance to earn
another (e.g., approach is rewarded with beer; avoidance rewarded
with wine). This would be followed by Pavlovian (S–O) training
where participants would learn the predictive relationship between
neutral stimuli and these same outcomes. During the subsequent
transfer test, occasional stimulus presentations would be expected
to facilitate/speed up the response associated with a common
outcome. For example, a stimulus for beer would be expected
to facilitate approach, while a stimulus for wine should facilitate
avoidance. General PIT, on the other hand, could be assessed by
comparing the influence of a stimulus associated with a third
outcome (e.g., whiskey) versus one associated with no alcoholic
drink.
fMRI research of the approach bias is scarce, but given the
wealth of knowledge that exists concerning the neural correlates
of the various motivational mechanisms highlighted in this review
(see Balleine and O’Doherty, 2009 for a detailed overview), this
could be a very fruitful avenue for investigating many of the ques-
tions raised thus far. Approach bias to cannabis using a manikin
task was recently investigated in an fMRI study with heavy cannabis
users (Cousijn et al., 2012). Results suggested that ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was recruited during congruent
“approach cannabis” blocks as opposed to incongruent “avoid
cannabis” blocks. The vmPFC/orbitofrontal cortex, along with the
caudate, have been consistently implicated in goal-directed action
(Valentin et al., 2007; de Wit et al., 2009, 2012b). Similar prefrontal
regions are argued to encode Pavlovian outcome values (Gottfried
et al., 2002, 2003). The results of Cousijn and colleagues suggest,
therefore, that the approach bias is driven by mechanisms flexibly
modulated by outcome value, as opposed to habits – the latter
being mediated not by prefrontal regions, but instead networks
involving the posterior putamen and premotor cortex (Tricomi
et al., 2009; Ashby et al., 2010; de Wit et al., 2012b). We should point
out however that another fMRI study reported contradictory find-
ings – namely that vmPFC was recruited on incongruent and not
congruent trials (Roelofs et al., 2009). Important methodological
differences could account for these differential results – Roelofs
and colleagues used a standard joystick task with affective, non-
drug-related facial stimuli (happy/unhappy faces) and the effects
disappeared when participants were instructed to approach/avoid
on the basis of gender rather than facial expression (irrelevant fea-
ture version). Future studies should hopefully be able to resolve
these findings.
Research examining the neural correlates of approach tenden-
cies would be best suited to approach bias paradigms with high
internal reliability – such as the relevant feature version of the
manikin task. A question of interest is whether networks impli-
cated in goal-directed control versus habitual control are recruited,
and whether this is different between groups who are at differ-
ent stages of addiction. In humans, differential regions of the
amygdala are thought to mediate general and outcome-specific
PIT (Prévost et al., 2012) and their engagement in approach bias
tasks could also be examined. fMRI can also be used to assess
the role of brain regions such as the anterior cingulate, known to
be important in overcoming response conflict and cognitive con-
trol more generally (reviews: Botvinick et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof
et al., 2004), during approach bias tasks. Although the fMRI
studies mentioned earlier examined contrasts of either congru-
ent> incongruent or incongruent> congruent – reporting the
results of both contrasts would be beneficial to test hypothe-
ses relating to the interaction between appetitive responses and
explicit cognitive control.
Pharmacological manipulations could also be employed to
investigate the effect of neurotransmitter depletion on approach
tendencies, with dopamine being an obvious candidate. Females
submitted to dopamine precursor depletion, for example, were
seen to rely more on habitual S–R knowledge at the expense of
goal-directed O–R knowledge in a task designed to assess the rel-
ative balance of these two systems (de Wit et al., 2012a). A GABA
antagonist (Baclofen), also thought to have effects via mediation of
dopaminergic systems, reduces craving and consumption in alco-
hol, and cigarette addiction (Franklin et al., 2009; Gorsane et al.,
2012) yet the effect on the approach bias has not been studied.
Studies of this type would help with attempts to understand what,
exactly, the approach bias represents and how it relates to other
measures such as craving.
Finally, the extent to which these manipulations selectively
affect approach versus avoidance (rather than the composite
approach bias score) is worth investigation. Some studies have
started to tease apart the relative contributions of “congruent”
approach responses to appetitive stimuli as opposed to “incon-
gruent” avoidance movements away from appetitive stimuli, with
interesting insights (Roelofs et al., 2009; Barkby et al., 2012;
Cousijn et al., 2012; Sharbanee et al., in press). By looking at
these processes separately we can gain a better understanding of
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what the approach bias actually measures and what role various
cognitive and motivational mechanisms play in producing this
effect.
CONCLUSION
Human behavior can be paradoxical, in that actions are initiated
that are seemingly incongruent with an individual’s explicit moti-
vations. This is most commonly observed in addiction, where mal-
adaptive behavior (i.e., drug seeking) appears to be compulsive.
Different theoretical approaches attempt to explain this behavior
in different ways, with some suggesting that positive expectan-
cies drive such behavior and others arguing that environmental
stimuli can trigger behaviors incongruent with current goals and
behavioral intentions. A number of studies have observed corre-
lations between problematic drug use and approach bias scores
(Field et al., 2008; Cousijn et al., 2011) suggesting that approach
bias measurements can index everyday behaviors. Understanding
the cognitive and motivational mechanisms that drive such an
approach bias may therefore provide insight into both adaptive
and maladaptive action control.
Determining the mechanisms underlying approach may have
clinical implications. Cognitive therapy may be useful if expectan-
cies and cognitive control are important determinants of
approach. On the other hand, alternative approaches such as expo-
sure response prevention therapy or counter-conditioning, that
target the behavior directly, may be more appropriate if approach
is stimulus-bound (e.g., van Gucht et al., 2010). Retraining the
approach bias using the ZJT has been shown to be effective in
reducing approach behavior toward alcohol cues (Wiers et al.,
2010), and in a clinical population such retraining of the approach
bias leads to a significantly smaller relapse rate at one-year follow-
up compared to individuals receiving sham training (Wiers et al.,
2011). A better understanding of the motivational mechanisms
that underlie the approach bias, will also provide a better under-
standing of what exactly is being trained in this novel paradigm
and how it can be better improved as a viable treatment.
Integration of the literature on approach bias, motivation, and
associative learning provides a clear framework with which to
identify and disentangle the relative contributions of various cog-
nitive and motivational mechanisms underlying such maladaptive
behavior. Whilst the literature surveyed suggests that both Pavlov-
ian and instrumental mechanisms contribute to the approach bias,
it remains to be elucidated exactly how they interact and sum to
produce approach behavior. Hopefully further research assessing
these questions will be forthcoming, within the limits that are
inherent to such a task paradigm. Understanding the mechanisms
that underlie an approach bias will provide a better understand-
ing of the complex interplay of automatic processes, outcome
expectancies, and behavioral intentions underlying human action
control. This is not only theoretically important but ultimately has
implications for clinical treatment.
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